OR/18/002 Concerns noted

Liddle, E and Fenner, R. 2017. Review of handpump-borehole implementation in Uganda. British Geological Survey Open Report, OR/18/002.

While Section 5 provided a descriptive overview of the planning, procurement, and implementation phases of HPB projects in Uganda, this section moves on to explain the key concerns that were noted within each of these aspects, along with the ways in which these are thought to be adversely affecting the quality of siting and D/I work, and ultimately HPB functionality. A number of quotes are included in this section to exemplify how different respondents feel about certain issues.

Planning

Lack of communication between CSOs and DWOs during CSO project planning

While the CSOs interviewed in this research all reported that they consult the relevant DWO, DWOs complained that a number of CSOs are not consulting them when they are selecting communities and throughout implementation. DWOs are frequently in the dark about the work that is being done in their districts, and without DWO direction, DWOs are concerned that the communities most in need (those with the lowest access rates) may not be those receiving new water sources. DWOs are also concerned that without their oversight, the quality of siting and D/I work may be suffering. It is then the DWO that communities expect to fix the HPB once the CSO leaves and the HPB fails (this issue is exacerbated when the CSO does not mobilise the community and train a WUC — the community assumes the DWO is then responsible for all O&M). As explained by a few DWOs:

“Some [CSOs] come through the DWO, but so many do not. It is very frustrating when they do not come through the DWO, as this leads to maintenance problems, and quality of work problems, and the community blames us. By then, the CSO is long gone, and it is us who are left to pick up the pieces” (DWO 4).

“We have a few [CSOs] but they aren’t good at coming through us. They just go out and do their own things. In the event that a CSO has implemented a hardware activity but has not trained a WUC, if I know I will try to supply money for their training. Because at the end of the day when they finish their project they hand the source to me. The long-term work is on me. So, if there is no WUC it affects me. I am responsible for rehabilitation costs because the CSO will have gone and I can’t leave the communities to suffer. So, if the CSO does not do a good job, it becomes a burden for me in the future. We have to pay for [WUC] training and rehabilitation” (DWO 1).

“Mobilising the community is a real challenge, they [CSOs] don't do it. They do not train [WUCs]. They need to engage and empower the people that the facility is theirs, but most times they leave and go back to where they are from. But then we are the ones who are left with the source afterwards and with the lack of a WUC, the people coming to our office asking for help when it then breaks down” (DWO 18).

DWOs also reported cases where this lack of communication has led to duplicate efforts. As DWOs plan and receive approval for new HPBs a year in advance, there have been cases where they have then gone to start work and found that a CSO has constructed a new HPB in between times. While the extra help may seem beneficial, for DWOs, adapting and redirecting funds to another community this late in the process is a difficult and often impossible given the number of approval steps DWOs must go through when selecting recipient communities. As explained by one DWO:

“There are very few [CSOs] that come through us. Most just go out and do their own work, they just go directly to the community and do their works and leave. Very few come and consult us. We just find a HPB when we go to a community that we did not know about. We don’t have details on the design, who drilled it, who the donor was. We find it very challenging. We budget and plan for a community and then go there and find there is already a HPB there. But once the council has approved for us to work there, it is very hard to change, we have to go right back to the planning phase which is very annoying. We can have visited in March, found the community needs a borehole, plan for them, procure and everything and then turn up to drill in September and find a borehole from a CSO. They simply do not tell us” (DWO 2).

Procurement and contractual matters

The decisions made and actions taken by those responsible for siting, D/I, and supervision directly determine the overall quality of the HPB that is left for community use at the end of a project. Poor work during the implementation phase can lead to a number of HPB functionally problems post-construction and can greatly increase the effort required and cost of O&M post- construction. Ensuring those responsible for siting, D/I, and supervision are qualified and able to conduct high-quality work once on-site is therefore crucial. Whether those responsible for siting, D/I, and supervision are qualified and able to conduct high-quality work once on-site largely depends on the decisions made during the procurement process, the price paid, and the payment terms that are specified in the given service provider’s contract. As stated by one respondent:

“The procurement process needs to be stringent, if you compromise procurement, you compromise everything. If you give to too low a bidder, they will cost cut and that is an issue. The procurement should be transparent and clear. Also, if you as the IA compromise the DC by demanding too low a price, you as the IA will force cost cutting and force the comprise of the work” (CSO 3).

The following sections provide an overview of the key procurement and contractual issues that were noted during this research, and highlights the ways that these procurement and contractual problems are affecting other factors within the process.

Limited consultant procurement for the siting work

As explained in Section 5.2.1, 100% of the CSOs and 63% of the DWOs interviewed are using turnkey contracts in which they procure a DC to do both the siting and the drilling work. As a result, consultants are being excluded. While excluding consultants may be sufficient when the procured DC has a competent hydrogeologist on staff, concerns were raised among MWE employees and consultants as to:

a) the extent to which the siting staff within DCs are indeed qualified hydrogeologists, and

b) the pressure that is being placed on the DCs to find a successful site, given that, under these turnkey contracts, the DC will not be paid if the borehole drilled is unsuccessful (lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms — see Section 6.2.8 for a wider discussion around the problems associated with these payment terms).

Additionally, frustration was reported among the consultants interviewed over the prevalence of turnkey contracts, with work having become extremely limited for them and business therefore suffering. While in some situations, DCs sub-contract the siting work to consultants, consultants are paid at much lower rates when sub-contracted (see Section 5.2.3), hence these contracts by themselves are not sufficient. Many have had to expand the number of services their businesses offer in order to maintain their cash flow. As explained by one consultant:

“We have to support [our business] with other activities because siting in supervision alone brings only close to 20% of what my company does. The other percentage comes from piped water systems. Siting and supervision has gone down with the turnkey contracts so we have had to shift away from it” (Consultant 8).

Turnkey contracts: why consultants are not procured for the siting work
Turnkey contracts came to prominence in Uganda in the mid-2000s as DWOs and CSOs became increasingly frustrated with the number of unsuccessful boreholes that were being drilled when consultants were conducting the siting work. Because the consultant was telling the DC where to drill, if the borehole was then unsuccessful, the IA had to pay the DC for the work done and materials used.

Unsuccessful boreholes were blamed on the quality of the consultants siting work, with ‘briefcase consultants’ (those with no formal geology or hydrogeology training) having flooded the market in the recent years. These ‘consultants’ would present fake documents when tendering and, because of the low prices they would offer (and the common desire among IAs to cut costs, see Section 6.2.3), they were gaining the siting contracts. IAs had no way of verifying the documents submitted by different consultants; identifying fakes was difficult.

Paying for unsuccessful boreholes because of incompetent consultants became problematic and challenging given the tight budgets DWOs and CSOs must work to. District water officers were being made to look inept in their jobs; the number of new water source commissioned each year was dropping, yet spending (of tax payer money) remained at the same rate. Politicians were subsequently worried that their constituents would be dissatisfied and that they, as a result, would be voted out of office. Politicians also failed to understand that unsuccessful boreholes were a common part of drilling. As a result, if an unsuccessful borehole was drilled and the DC paid for this, politicians saw this as corrupt, with some district water officers facing jail as a result. Similar issues were being faced in CSOs, with number of new water source targets suffering under CSO projects. Project managers within CSOs encountered the same challenges as the district water officers when trying to explain these issues to their donors.

Moreover, it was also thought that collusion between the DC and consultant was occurring when the siting consultant was also responsible for supervision. DWOs and CSOs found that DCs were findings ways of increasing their costs as they drilled (as they were to be paid admeasurement for all work done/materials used), for example by using additional materials, saying that they used greater quantities of materials than they did, or saying that they drilled deeper than they did, with the consultant then signing off for all of these quantities.

The solution from the DWO and CSO point of view: remove the ‘middle man’, the consultant. Instead, give all the responsibility for finding water to the DC (i.e. the DC was to be responsible for siting + D/I = turnkey). If the DC then drills an unsuccessful borehole, they will not be paid as they were the ones responsible for siting the borehole, all the risk for finding water of an adequate yield was on them (= no-water-no-pay). To then stop DCs from drilling deeper than needed or using additional materials, the DWO or CSO was to agree on a total price with the DC pre-drilling. This price was all that would be paid upon the drilling of a successful borehole, regardless of what happens on-site (= lump sum). The DWO and CSOs would no longer be wasting money on unsuccessful sites — for all money spent, there would be a successful, ready to use, borehole. Failing to meet new water sources targets would no longer be an issue.

Table 6.1 Examples of why DWOs and CSOs turned to turnkey contracts.

“We found that when we had a consultant do the siting work that later we had challenges because there used to be problems when the DC would drill and the borehole would be dry. In this situation, he wasn't liable because he had not done the siting so we still had to pay him for the work done. It was hard to pay for dry holes so we decided to give all of the risk onto the DC and by doing this we ensure that we have a successful borehole at the end of the day” (CSO 9).

“We realised that some of these risks [of drilling] can be covered by the DC... So, we did some computations to see what percentages of our boreholes were unsuccessful, whether this was a fault of saltiness, a fault of water quality, or a fault of yield. We talked to DCs to do these calculations, for them to tell us what the price to be, and after this we turned to a turnkey contract” (CSO 7).

“As of a few years ago we used this method [procuring both a consultant and a DC]... but this had problems. As you know, during siting you might find water but then DCs would come a drill and not find water. We had problems there because how could we pay a DC for a dry hole? But when I hired a consultant I have shifted all the risks to him. It was very hard to explain these dry holes and to know who was responsible, the consultant or the DC. But it was very obvious. The DC would say according to the siting report I am supposed to drill 80 metres, but I have and there is no water, he would say pay me and there was no way I could say no. So after so many cases as a district we said no we need to make it one contract, a turnkey contract…So then the DC was liable, if they drilled and didn’t get water they wouldn’t get paid…the responsibility was on them and we didn’t waste money. Combining them [the contracts] is easier and less hectic. There are fewer people to manage and supervise. It hurts us to have to pay the DC when you have no result because of the consultant. It is a waste of money” (DWO 1).

“In some areas of the district, it is very hard to find groundwater…back in early 2000's we had CSO project come in. They drilled 86 holes, only 32 were successful. They had used a private consultant and DC. But you know, water, it is so hard to find, so we learned from these mistakes and decided that, no, we would not hire a separate consultant for the survey work because the risk of dry boreholes was too high, even with a consultant” (DWO 4).

“We are more comfortable with turnkey, we used to use split contracts but we had a lot of problems. The consultant would come and do the siting, the DC comes and there is no water. We had a lot of issues with accountability… even the politicians themselves check on us, so if we drill a dry hole and then pay for this, the politicians will come back and ask us why we paid. Plus, the technical people, we appreciate even though there is no water that the DC has done their job and he deserves to be paid for what he did. But the people higher up the chain did not understand this, so this is a tricky one…We want to be safe in our jobs, so we have had to keep doing turnkey because that is when we know we are sure to have water… it is hard to find groundwater, so you might drill 8, but 3 will be dry, you will be paying a lot of money for these dry holes, but then people complain that we are spending public money and we have to explain to people who do not understand the technical side. So we do what we have to to make people happy and keep us safe” (DWO 7).

“We use turnkey. When I first started this job were using separate contracts and paid by admeasurement but I found it to give me issues so I gave turnkey a trial and it has been much better... We had a number of issues with using separate contracts, one for the consultant and one for DC. The first, sometimes the borehole will have issues after construction and in these cases, it would be hard to know whose fault it was. The second, output was low. We had a number of issues with dry holes that we then had to pay for. In these cases it was not the DCs fault, but it was the consultants, all responsibility was on the consultant to find the site, the DC would just turn up to drill. But we ended up with a lot of dry holes and it was a waste of money as he had to be paid admeasurement for all work done. In some cases we feel that the DC even knew that it was not a good site, but they would drill anyway as if they drilled them get some money... Our success rate was only around 60% but we had to pay for all… Overall we have found turnkey is much more time efficient and we have eliminated all of these problems I have explained... Under this premise we end up getting 10 out of 10 boreholes delivered” (DWO 11).

Limited consultant procurement for the supervision work

Procuring a consultant for supervision in Uganda was limited among the IAs interviewed: only 38% do so. Consultants are not typically procured for supervision for the following reasons:

a) Supervision adds an additional cost, which, given their limited budgets and the need to deliver as many new water sources as possible within these budgets, many project managers within the IAs interviewed simply cannot justify the cost of supervision to their superiors. As explained by three IAs:

“We do not hire a consultant to do this [supervision] work for us it is too expensive. It would increase the price per borehole it would decrease the number that we are able to do (CSO 8).

“We don’t have contracts for supervising, districts do not have enough money. So, if you were to have all those costs, it would not work, by the end of the day you won’t have a borehole” (DWO 3).

“It would be very expensive to get a person to sit on-site throughout [for supervision]” (CSO 3).

b) Turnkey contracts; in the past, the siting and supervision work would be given under the same contract, hence, as consultant procurement for siting ceased under turnkey contracts, so did supervision. Additionally, as under turnkey contracts, IAs do not have to pay for unsuccessful boreholes, it is less of a necessity from their point of view to guarantee the quality of work; if the borehole is unsuccessful, they will not suffer. Consequently, there is limited incentive for paying a qualified consultant to supervise, or even having one of their own employees on-site full-time. There was an obvious attitude during the IAs interviewed that under turnkey contracts, what the DC does is his/her business, the IAs simply want there to be water at the end of the day, and if it ends up being unsuccessful, it is of no loss to them. As explained by one DWO:

“You know, when you use split contracts we did this, because the hydrogeologist that did the site survey would also do the supervision, but now with turnkey, we stopped

procuring a hydrogeologist for the site work so we stopped procuring for supervision. It seems that this dropped off naturally” (DWO 7).

As also explained by a DC:

“The supervisors [when we are on a turnkey contract] are very questionable. Because they don’t have to pay us for dry holes, they don’t care about the quality of work, they will just go and sleep under the tree” (DC 2).

c) A simple belief that supervision is not needed/that the benefits of supervision are minimal. As explained by one CSO:

“We don't want to have to have a supervisor on site full-time as we believe that the benefit of this is very minimal. Here we only have four technical officers including myself and if we were going to supervise in that much detail we would need to increase our numbers” (CSO 7).

Aspects of this belief come back to the fact that ‘consultants’, typically unqualified briefcase consultants, have performed poorly in the past.

A number of concerns were raised by those interviewed within MWE and the TSU, as well as by consultants themselves, around the quality of D/I work conducted when a qualified consultant is not on-site supervising full-time. These are discussed in Section 6.3.4.

How bids are evaluated: The conflict between price and technical capability

Concerns were repeatedly raised by consultants and DCs as to the ways in which their bids are evaluated, with many feeling that they lose contracts as those evaluating their bids are more concerned with selecting the lowest bidder than the most technically capable. If they quote based on the cost of high-quality work, using appropriate, yet perhaps more expensive materials, they worry that they will automatically exceed what the DWOs and CSOs are willing to pay. Some of the DCs and consultants interviewed believed that this issue was due to a lack of technical expertise on evaluation committees. As explained by one DC and one consultant:

“The procurement process has to improve! This is the top issue I would say. The biggest challenge is in procurement system, the people procuring don’t know what they are doing, they are not technical people. Engineers are not involved, they simply go for the lowest price, they don’t understand what they are pricing and this affects the final outcome. If you mess with procurement and get this wrong, there is no hope for the final product. People who know about boreholes should be doing the procurement! Just because you have a business degree does not mean you can procure DCs” (DC 8).

“The procurement office does a market survey but normally they do not have the background on what the work is going to entail as they are not technical. So, for the numbers, they look at the lowest price and nominate a system of evaluation based on the low price. So at the end of the day, because of competition between various siting companies there is a tendency for people under quote. So, you will have people quoting as low as UGX 1 million because they need to add numbers to their output for the year” (Consultant 9).

While a lack of technical knowledge may be an issue for some IA evaluation committees, the evidence gathered from IAs in this research does not suggest that this is an issue, with all bar 3 (n=29) of the IAs involving a technical member of staff from the water office in bid evaluation. Rather, the evidence suggests that a number of additional aspects are at play here, as explained below.

1) Limited and tightly stretched budgets

In a number of cases, IAs reported that they are simply unable to procure the more technically capable consultants and DCs due to limited and tightly stretched budgets. Many IAs are trying to install the maximum number of HPBs they possibly can within their given budget, because: a) they need to reach the number of new water source targets that have been set by them or their superiors and b) they genuinely want to deliver safe water to those without.

2) Inaccurate price per HPB budgets

In addition to limited and tightly stretched budgets is the issue of the price per HPB IAs are budgeting for the D/I aspect of work. A fixed price is typically budgeted for D/I - never is the budgeted price per HPB for the D/I work based on the actual on-site conditions as the siting work is never conducted before IA budget is prepared, nor before the DC is procured (see Section 6.2.6). As a result, there is a risk that the budget per HPB the evaluation committee is using as a guide when evaluating the DCs, under-estimates the price that will be needed in reality. The same is true for consultants; a fixed price is typically budgeted for siting and supervision. Little thought is given to the hydrogeological complexity of the area and the number of siting days that will therefore be needed. Additionally, there are no regulated engineer’s estimates available in Uganda that specify the total cost of drilling to differing depths in different areas in the country or the cost of siting and supervision in these areas. This means that often the IA’s per HPB budget is the only guide the evaluation committee has when assessing the quotes in front of them.

Evaluation committee’s hands are tied; they do not have the necessary power to increase the budget for D/I, nor for siting and supervision. Instead, they have to find a consultant and DC whose quotes fit the budget they have been given. If not, number of new water source targets will suffer. Therefore, when evaluation committees are presented with a range of consultant and DC quotes, all of whom have valid consultancy and drilling licenses, selecting the lowest among these seems logical and like their only option.

3) Low prices are being quoted by those bidding

A large part of the problem here is the prices consultants and DCs are quoting during bidding, with many submitting quotes that are not sufficient for high-quality work. As soon as one of these quotes is opened by the evaluation committee, the opportunity to select a low bid - one that will not allow for high-quality work - is right in front of them. An issue was noted here, whereby it was repeatedly reported that consultants and DCs are under-quoting when bidding for contracts, either purposefully (point a and b below) or inadvertently (point c below). Certain consultants and DCs may be enabling and encouraging low prices by placing low quotes in front of evaluation committees. So why are consultants and DCs submitting quotes that are not suitable for high-quality work? Three reasons are explained below.

a) Competition: as more consultants and DCs bid for contracts, there is an increased need to outbid others. In this case, competition for contracts is driving the prices quoted down, as consultants and DCs attempt to be in with a chance of winning the contract. While competition is a normal part of any bidding process, if in this case, the prices continue to decrease as consultants and DCs become desperate to win contracts, there is a risk that the quotes placed in front of the evaluation committee will be insufficient for high-quality work. As explained by two DCs:

“When we bid for the work we always say how much we want to be paid per site. The BoQ that we prepare is based on estimates the IA has given us so most of the CSOs base this on a stock standard design and number of metres. But we have to be very careful when prepare and as the competition for the these contracts is high so if we priced too high we will not get the work” (DC 14).

“We are having to do some underpricing simply because of the competition… because of the competition, people are quoting very low prices that we have to compete with” (DC 12).

When low bids, as a result of competition, are placed in front of evaluation committees, there is a risk that IAs will select these; as explained by one DWO:

“[We normally pay] around 22 million, and it is very low. Why? Because we are near Kampala so we receive very many bidders and they want to outcompete each other so they bid quite low. But this is a very big challenge for us that we are near Kampala so when they hear that we are going to drill they look at outcompeting others. So this financial year there is a borehole that I paid 17 million for” (DWO 19).

b) Price paid in previous project cycles: as IAs continue to award contracts to low bidding consultants and DCs, the price consultants and DCs quote in future project cycles suffers. Consultants and DCs have established the rough price different IAs typically pay and are now using these as their benchmark figures when bidding for future work. While this makes sense, if the price the IA is known for paying is insufficient for high-quality work, low prices will be placed in front of the evaluation committee time and time again in future project cycles. As a result of this issue in Uganda, some consultants and DCs have simply excluded themselves and do not bid for the given IA’s work (see Section 6.2.9), however, others who are desperate for work, or those who do not mind lowering their quality of work to keep costs within the price they quote, go ahead and bid within the range the IA is known for. As explained by one DC:

“Say they [a DC] haven’t had any work for 3 months because they have been unwilling to lower their costs, after a while they will get desperate and go for one of the lower paid jobs, but once again they will have to cut costs” (DC 2).

c) Inaccurate bidding document technical specifications: the site-specific accuracy of the bidding document technical specifications for both consultant and DC contracts is crucial if the prices quoted during bidding are to be sufficient for high-quality work at the given site. Without accurate technical specifications, consultants and DCs are unable to accurately estimate the cost of their work. For consultant contracts, however, the number of days specified for both siting and supervision rarely take into account the hydrogeological complexity of the area, while for DCs, the technical specifications are typically inaccurate given that siting work is never conducted before the DC bidding document technical specifications (see Section 6.2.6). Instead, the site details are either estimated from past work in the area or they are stock-standard specifications that are used for all the given IA’s contracts, regardless of the geographical location.

Inaccuracy at this stage is particularly problematic when the contract is being paid via lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms: the price the consultant or the DC quotes is the final price they will be paid, regardless of the conditions they find on-site. DCs in particular are frustrated with the number of times they are having to spend additional money, simply because the technical specifications they were given at the time of bidding, hence those they used to prepare their BoQ when bidding (with this calculating their total lump sum price), underestimated the work required at the given site. In these situations, the only way DCs can prevent operating at a financial loss is to either: a) include a degree of risk in their quotes, however, they then run the risk of not winning the contract (as their quote will no longer be the lowest), or b) cut costs while drilling. As explained by three DCs:

“The other big issue here is that everything is based on estimated depth to water. Sometimes this is absolute rubbish. We go to do the survey work only to find we need to drill an extra 20 metres…if the survey work was done and the results of this were used to procure and form the contract technical specifications, so many of these issues would no longer be a problem. The depth water in the contract would be a lot more accurate our BoQs could be a lot more accurate” (DC 2).

“For us to do a proper BoQ before getting the contract we really need to know the siting results, but we never do because siting is part of this contract. Knowing the site details would help because we would know the design and expected materials etc. So, it is guess work when we prepare this BoQ [and prepare our quote]” (DC 3).

“The CSOs just pay the same price no matter whether it's collapsing and we need to use fully cased or hard rock so that is open hole. But they say no there is no variation in the amount that we will get... So we have to give a price per borehole no matter what design will be, and often they don't give us adequate guidance before we quote as to what the design will most likely be as the site selection hasn’t been done yet, we just find out during drilling, they just give us stock-standard design and often expected it to be open hole so expect us to quote as an open hole... So we may quote 20 bags [of gravel] because that's what they told us to expect and we get our site and find we need to use 50 [bags]. They just give us stock-standard specifications to begin with and these are purely estimates, well not even estimates, they are just stock-standard. We then have to cover the differences. So there are some cases where we will gain and some cases where we lose, but it is still very difficult for us.” (DC 14).

A number of respondents raised concerns that these low bids that win contracts are not sufficient for high-quality work. Low prices cause consultants and DCs to cut corners as they work to save on their costs, for example, through:

a) using hydrogeologically inappropriate materials (GI over stainless steel — see Section 6.3.3),

b) using lower quality materials (low grade stainless steel – see Section 6.3.3), or

c) reducing the time spent on-site and the money spent on drilling by concluding drilling at the first water strike.

Low price related quality of work issues are exacerbated when coupled with lump sum no-water- no-pay payment terms. This issue is explained in more depth in Section 6.2.8 and Section 6.2.9.

In many cases, project managers within the IAs interviewed were aware of the need to not necessarily pick the lowest bidder, even if they had passed the technical evaluation, as they realise that even DCs with right equipment and skills (pass the technical evaluation) are in some cases submitting low quotes that are not sufficient for high-quality work. Yet if IAs are to meet their new water source targets for the given year, they need to select the lowest bidder. Furthermore, if they try to select a more expensive DC, their superiors, be it the CAO or politicians, for example in the case of DWOs, do not allow them to. As explained by two DWOs:

“Lower bids from less qualified DCs will always be there, there is a lot of competition within the bidding process so people bid low. I as a technical person know that they will have to compromise if they are going to deliver the borehole within this price, the money they offer is far less than what they can actually do with it. But the problem here is the evaluation committee is always looking for the lowest bidder, they want to save money, so they see these bidders and say they have to win the contract. If I try to argue this I lose. If I take it to the District Council, they agree with the evaluation committee, they want to please the people and drill as many boreholes as possible. Here there’s a big risk of cost cutting once they are in the field. They [the DCs] need to save money, e.g. they may put less casing in than needed. In other cases, it may have been thought that DTH drilling would be required. However, once you’re on-site you might realise that mud drilling is needed because of the formation. If the DC bided too low and did not leave room for uncertainty in his cost, he will not be able to afford mud drilling. But the evaluation committee always wants to go with the lowest bidder. I will always be there arguing as a technical person that we need to pick the most technically capable DC. This is always a difficult and challenging conversation to have though and I never win” (DWO 3).

“Even if I as an engineer am on the evaluation committee and I say this company should win, if you can find somebody who has quoted less and who on paper meets all of the technical requirements, then they [the others on the evaluation committee] have to go with this person even if I do not agree” (DWO 14).

Procurement delays (specifically in DWO projects)

Delays within the procurement process were repeatedly reported by DWOs, with these often leading to rushed siting and D/I work at the end of the financial year — if DWO work is not completed by June, they will lose their money. DWO procurement should be completed by mid-September (according to the DIM, MWE (2013b)). As shown in Table 6.2, 45% of DLGs met the mid-September deadline in the financial year 2016/17.

Table 6.2 The month each of the DLGs to completed procurement in for HPB projects in the financial year 2016/17. NB: all procurement should start in June and be completed by mid-September according to the DIM (MWE, 2013b). Grey shading indicates those that met the DIM deadline of mid-September, while black shows those that did not.

	Aug 16	Sept 16	Oct 16	Nov 16	Dec 16	Jan 17	Feb 17	Mar 17
DLG 1
DLG 2
DLG 3
DLG 4
DLG 5
DLG 6
DLG 7
DLG 8
DLG 9
DLG 10
DLG 11
DLG 12
DLG 13
DLG 14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DLG 15
DLG 16
DLG 17
DLG 18
DLG 19
DLG 20
- no response

Delays arise as a result of:

• PDUs advertising all procurement needs for the given year in the same newspaper advert, due to the cost of doing so; one full page black and white advert in the New Vision newspaper costs UGX 8 100 000. Given the high cost, PDUs (all of those interviewed) wait for all user departments, including, for example, the health and education, to submit their procurement plans for the coming financial year before the advert can be released.
• In some cases, the district evaluation committee (DEC) only meets once a year so they can evaluate all user department procurement needs in the same meeting. This was the case with 35% of the DLGs included in this research. Delays from other user departments, or simply delays in when those on the DEC are available to meet, can therefore slow the whole procurement process. An issue was noted here in that for those who sit on the DEC, this is additional work on top of their normal workload; however, they are not paid any kind of additional allowance for this time. Consequently, if they have other work that needs to be completed or another job that is paying an allowance, they will prioritise this over the DEC meeting. All members of the DEC need to be available for the meeting to take place.
• Delays in when funds from the MoFPED come through — contracts can only be signed once the DLG has received these funds. Funds are released to DLGs on a quarterly basis, however, delays are common.

As explained, firstly by three PDUs, and then by a DWO:

“We always want to do it [procurement] in the first two months of the financial year but normally fail to do so because of issues. We have to wait for all the offices to submit their plans and that slows us down. So, we normally procure September, October, November. By early December the contract is awarded. But then we can be further delayed if the funds have not come through, we cannot sign the contract until we have the money. So, that can delay things further because drilling cannot start until the contract has been signed. We are often delayed by the DWO as normally the technical specifications from the DWO take a while, either they don’t know what to do or they don’t have enough time to do it. Also, back during the procurement process we have issues with getting the evaluation committee to meet. By law, they are not provided with allowances, so this is additional work for them. So, people will prefer to follow their normal work than come to the evaluation committee. So, getting all departments to be available for the meeting is hard. The evaluation is very tricky” (PDU 1).

“Facilitation for the procurement process is a big problem, and, without money, the members of the evaluation committee cannot be facilitated, we are unable to pay for their time. They expect to be paid. So, if somebody has an invitation to do some other kind of work that day that they will be paid for, they will not come to the evaluation committee meeting. So, we are having such challenges there… If an NGO is paying them to supervise, they will go there instead. We really need to be able to pay this person as this is additional work on top of their normal duties, but we cannot. So we have to sit without them or we have to delay, but this then delays everything else and may make it hard to meet time deadlines” (PDU 13).

“And then the other challenge that we have is when funds are delayed. Normally the Ministry of Finance releases funds on a quarterly basis but the process takes a long time. So, the Ministry issues letters showing that the funds have been released but the time it takes to actually be available is almost 2 weeks. And even the Ministry of Finance does not release these letters and the funds on the first day of the quarter, they delay in both of these steps so for about one month every quarter we don't have any money. So, we lose time every quarter due to this process so our activities are sometimes delayed” (PDU 8).

“Often the procurement process is long and delayed. We may send a request as early as the first quarter but the procurement process might go on into the third quarter and this is a challenge because it is something that is beyond us. The local government structure means that a number of people are involved in this process and if somebody along the way is not doing their part on time, it affects the others. There is an English saying, a chain is as strong as its weakest link, so sometimes if there is somebody not doing their part, it effects on us. We ideally want the contract to be awarded by the end of the first quarter but this never happens, but we would want to be drilling and to be finished by January if possible” (DWO 12).

Procurement delays force work to be rushed once in the field. In the financial year 2016/17, for example, DWO 3 submitted their procurement needs in August 2016, yet due to procurement delays, the bid opening meeting was only just occurring as our interview took place in March 2017. The DWO then worried that they then only had until May 2017 to site, drill, and install their 18 HPBs. Such issues are exacerbated when the same consultant or DC has multiple contracts with different DWOs – if all of these DWOs experience procurement delays, work has to be rushed even more in order to complete it all by the end of May. As explained by a few different DWOs:

“We then have issues with delays and implementation when the DC has 3, 4, 5 or 7 districts that they are working in. This means they are often late coming to us and often over run the contract period. Our money gets chopped at the end of June so if they do not implement and if we cannot pay before this, then we lose our money. So if they can't come to site in the required time this is very challenging, and we had this problem last year. We put a date in the contract that their work must be completed by, so if we award in December we give a maximum of four months, so they must be finished by April. So often we find that they have contracted a number of other districts and they have to de-mobilise from there and then mobilise here and that takes a lot of time. Depending on the completion dates that other districts have given they may not come to us first. They may go to another first, even if the completion date is only one day different” (DWO 16).

“The DC may be delayed if the consultant is late doing the survey or if he has contracts in other districts, he might not always start with us. But we may have told the DC that we want works to be completed by January and by December the consultant is not here yet. The last financial year we had the DC parked here for about two weeks waiting for the siting report. There can be delays with all of these players” (DWO 9).

“A big challenge is when the DC does not turn up on time. You know, this past financial year, we procured early, by October. We then wanted to drill in February, but they said that no, they are delayed. They then came in April” (DWO 4).

“We don't have many DCs, maybe about 40, and the challenge is that all local governments follow the same implementation cycle, we are all doing work in the same months of the year, so any one time you'll have so many districts doing the implementation but the DCs are few. So, we might sign a DC but then it turns out they have contracts from many districts and then they have a limited number of personnel and equipment so they cannot be in all 10 districts at the same time so they have to move from one district to another, and by the time they finish in the last district the financial year may be about to end and if we overrun, by the end of June we lose the money” (DWO 12).

Bribes during the procurement process

Several references to bribes needing to be paid during procurement were made by consultants and DCs, specifically for DWO work. When a bribe is demanded, consultants and DCs struggle to account for this cost: if they account for this in their quote, their quote will be too high, and given the desire to award the contract to the lowest bidder (see Section 6.2.3), they will not win the contract. If, however, they do not account for the price of the bribe in their quote, the consultant or DC will then need to recover this cost at some stage, with short cuts then needing to be taken once on-site to do so. These issues are best explained by the following quotes. The first is from a consultant and the second, a DC:

“You have to talk to the people offering work, and in some cases you have to pay. You may be the one who is the best for the job, you pre-qualify, you have all the things, but then someone says, well for us to give you the work you have to pay us some money. Either you pay or you will not get the work, someone else will… [this is] with local government, the districts, the procurement team at the district level. Not so much central government, they are fair. It is not the DWO, they do not have any power at the point of procurement, it is all on the procurement and contracts offices. The procurement office has a lot of power and will make a lot of decisions. He will decide to give you a contract even if you are the worst for the job, people underprice, and they pick those ones. They take the final decision and that is worrying. Either you get the work or you have to pay your way out… most of the time it is 10% of the contract price… They should not be asking for anything, it is illegal. They shouldn’t but they do. If there are 4, 5 companies bidding, if you want to get the contract, you have to pay. They evaluate the bids, come to you and say you are the best, but then ask for money. If there are other persons and you don’t pay, they will find someone else. They will then find an answer, a reason, for why you did not get the contract… That is one of the challenges. If you put in a figure and add on the presumptive 10% then sometimes you will be out of their range, so you will not get the job. But if you then do not include the 10% in your budget, that reduces the profit margin for the company, we then have to cover that 10% if it comes up. When this is the case we then have to start thinking about where we can save money. Some companies resort to doing supervision on the phone! They call the DC in the field, they are not there physically. The best way is to be there, to see it in person. But people have to try save costs. Also the quality of work when you are finding a site will decrease. You have to look faster to break even. These are big challenges” (Consultant 1).

“As of now though, the transparency of procurement is rather poor [for DWO contracts],… there are companies that are corrupting the sector, they go and bribe the local governments and give them money for contracts… They [the districts] say that if we want the job we have to pay them UGX 10 million. If it is five boreholes, that is 10% of the contract price. Now that is handled by procurement not the water office, it is procurement wanting this money. Then after you get the award you start seeing more and more people, so the CAO, the district water officer, and now they want more money from us, the UGX 10 million went to procurement, and now the rest say that we gave you the jobs so now you need to pay us as well to say thank you… that has to come out of our profit, and there is no profit left we actually end up running in the black. But if we account for this and somehow include it in our quote by increasing the price of a few other things, we then don’t get the contact because our price will be too high” (DC 12).

Timing of siting procurement versus DC procurement

None of the IAs interviewed procure for the siting work before they procure for the DC work. While with turnkey contracts, it is obvious that the siting procurement would not be conducted before the DC is procured, as it is the DC that is responsible for this, this is also the case when a consultant is being procured for the siting and a DC for the D/I. Instead, all aspects of consultant and DC procurement are run in tandem: from the advert, to the bid opening, to the evaluation, and to the signing of contracts.

One major issue arises as a result of turnkey contracts and parallel consultant and DC procurement: the siting work is never completed before the DC bidding documents, including the technical specifications that detail the expected borehole design, are prepared. This timing issues means that the technical specifications then have to either be estimated from past work in the area (92% of IAs that are procuring a DC) or stock-standard specifications are used for all the given IA’s contracts, regardless of the geographical location (8% of IAs that are procuring a DC). One prominent CSO for example, specifies a drilling depth of 75 metres for all their HPBs, regardless of where the HPB is to be drilled. The accuracy of these technical specifications is then brought into question. According to Carter et al. (2014), the siting work should be conducted first, by a private consultant, so the siting report can then be used to prepare the DC bidding document technical specifications. Furthermore, even if estimates need to be made, these should be made by a hydrogeologist who understands the hydrogeology of the given area in detail. The consultants and MWE employees interviewed repeatedly raised concerns over the estimates that are being made, given that those estimating these specifications in DWOs and CSOs are water or civil engineers. They are not hydrogeologists.

The lack of site-specific accuracy in the DC bidding document technical specifications goes on to affect:

a) the site-specific accuracy of the IA’s budget (see Section 6.2.3),

b) the site-specific accuracy of the quotes DCs include in their bids (see Section 6.2.3),

c) the evaluation committee’s awareness of the price the DC needs to be paid if high-quality work is to be conducted at the given site (see Section 6.2.3), and

d) the extent to which the winning DC is then prepared with the correct drilling equipment and materials for the given site’s hydrogeological conditions when they arrive on-site (see Section 6.3.2).

These all go on to affect the quality of D/I (see the respective sections for descriptions of how exactly).

When asking IAs who procure both a consultant and a DC why the consultant is not procured first, the answer was simple: it takes double the time and double the cost to run two procurement cycles. Among the DWOs interviewed, for example, one procurement cycle can currently take anywhere between two - nine months; doing this twice would greatly slow the time taken to deliver new HPBs. Given the strict financial year rules, with DWOs needing to complete all works by May so payment can be made before the end of the financial year (June), running two procurement cycles is difficult. If a DWO overruns and work is not completed by May, their conditional grant money must be returned to the MoFPED. Furthermore, there is then the cost of procurement, with a single newspaper advert, for example, costing UGX 8,100,000, as explained in Section 6.2.4. Running an advert once for the consultant and then again a few months later for the DC is unrealistic given the budget constraints among PDUs, with limited amounts of money being available each year for procurement costs.

As explained by one DWO:

“What would be ideal is for the siting to be done and we could then use this report to develop the technical specifications and then we procure the DC. But if we did this the process to be very long and this would affect the cycle of implementation. So, to overcome this we procure at the same time…We would prefer to do the consultant first but because we need to cut down on costs we have to advertise at the same time. Advertising is very expensive” (DWO 8).

The use of lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms for consultants and the price paid when successful

As explained in Section 5.2.3, consultants, when procured, are paid via lump sum no-water-no- pay contracts. While the consultants interviewed do not mind being paid in this way, they are dissatisfied with the rates that different IAs offer, especially those of DCs and DWOs (see Table 5.2, Section 5.2.3).

When asking consultants how much they would need to be paid to cover the costs of high-quality siting and supervision, the following prices were reported:

• Siting only: UGX 1.2 million - UGX 1.7 million,
• Siting and supervision: UGX 2.5 million - UGX 3.5 million.

The price DCs are willing to pay for siting only and the price DWOs are willing to pay for siting and supervision fall below the above values. CSO prices, however, fall within the above siting and supervision range, as they are typically willing to pay UGX 2.5 million – UGX 3.54 million for these contracts (see Table 5.2, Section 5.2.3).

In addition to the prices DCs and DWOs are willing to pay being insufficient for high-quality work from the consultant point of view, the consultants interviewed also raised concerns over the fact that under these lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms, IAs rarely take the hydrogeological complexity of the area into consideration when specifying the number of work days in the bidding documents. Instead, it is assumed that it will take the same number of days to find a productive site in area x as in area y, as well as the same number of days for supervision. As explained by two consultants:

With supervision, there is no way to shortcut because you need to be there full-time. If the DC takes one week, we need to be on-site the whole week. This can get tricky… With one IA at moment we have supervised one borehole for a whole month, my supervisor is still on-site and even though I only budgeted UGX 300 000 for him [wages] total, I now have to pay him 30 days. And yet the borehole still is not finished. There are boulders and things down the borehole and they have tried to drill two holes so far and failed. They are now starting the third. Once they get to 60 metres they come across boulders and a struggle” (Consultant 7).

“For DWOs, they standardised their rates 10 years ago and they have not changed, it is about UGX 1.5 million for siting and supervision. The number of days work is variable based on the site, siting can be 1 day or 1 week, the same with supervision. We are paid a lump sum though, it doesn’t matter how many days work it will take” (Consultant 4).

Furthermore, while the consultants interviewed understand why the no-water-no-pay clause is included in their contracts, they are dissatisfied when this is used in certain areas of the country where it is difficult to find water. As described by one consultant:

“They expect to always find water. This is impossible, but they expect that if they drill they will find water. If they don’t, we are blamed, even though we tell them it is not guaranteed. [If the borehole is unsuccessful] they don’t pay you. They may then get us to do an additional survey which they will pay for. For them, they don’t understand that we cannot always find water, they don’t understand the basics of groundwater” (Consultant 2).

Additionally, consultants also find siting for DCs under a turnkey contracts challenging, as in these situations, they are not involved in supervision. As a result, if the borehole unsuccessful, there is no way of knowing whether this was a fault of their siting, or the DCs poor work. As described by one consultant:

“[When we site for a DC], we are absolutely not [paid if the borehole is unsuccessful]. Those are some of the challenges, they then make us go back a site again… But if it is unsuccessful, we never know if it was our fault or because of their bad drilling, this is a real challenge with these turnkey contracts when it is the DC hiring us”(Consultant 3).

Insufficient prices, coupled with the lump sum no-water-no-pay issues discussed above, are putting consultants in Uganda under pressure financially. Two key problems were reported as a result of these pressures:

a) Low prices are forcing consultants to limit the time they spend on siting in an attempt to keep the cost of work within the lump sum prices of their contracts. While the consultants interviewed stated that they never let the quality of the site itself suffer, they only have time to do the bare minimum needed to identify a successful site. They do not have time however to identify the best site in the given area. Furthermore, the data gathered during this process is not always as detailed as the consultants would like it to be. As explained by three consultants:

“The challenge is though that many times we want to use of different kinds of technology to identify a site, so for places that are highly crystalline rock, we want to use the best technology to find the fractures and use the electromagnetic but because of the price we are paid we have to eliminate electromagnetics. This does not affect the success rate but it does mean that we do not fully survey the place to get the best site, we can only get water that will make the DC pass, but not the best. Given the low money that we are given, this is all that we can do” (Consultant 9).

“With the DWOs and the DCs, we just do the very basics, so we just look for water, we don't look for the best site, just one that is going to actually pass when it comes to drilling. There is much more that as a hydrogeologist I think needs to be done on site but we simply don't have the time given how much money we get to go into detail…Our work is not as intensive as it should be, our aim is simply to secure sites” (Consultant 7).

“Sometimes we do not do the full extent of site survey work that we want to do as we do not have the money to do so. We just find the very basic details because they haven't paid enough to do the job in full detail” (Consultant 8).

b) Low prices are limiting the extent to which the directors of consultancy firms can send skilled employees to the field for supervision. While these firms use trained hydrogeologists for the siting work, they typically hire additional casual employees for supervision. Being able to employ well-educated individuals who are able to accurately log formations etc. (for example, those with 3-year degrees in geology + additional training in hydrogeology) is difficult as they struggle to convince these people to work in remote areas, given the daily rate the directors can afford to pay. When asking consultants how much they pay their supervision employees, between UGX 30 000 -UGX 50 000 per day was reported. As explained by one consultant:

“There are not many geologists who are willing to be supervise on site. So, we normally employ people with a diploma in civil or chemical engineering, but sometimes we get people who have adapted into this field because they are flexible and willing to work. More qualified people are not willing to go to the remote areas where they have to stay in the field and be paid the low rates. They earn a lump sum for the whole supervision, UGX 150 000. This does not include transport or accommodation. This could be a week’s work… hiring qualified people is hard” (Consultant 4).

Limited skill sets among supervision employees is concerning, with the suitability of the borehole designs for the hydrogeological conditions, the quality of the logging data, and the relationship between the DC the supervisor all suffering as a result. Low-quality logging data is of concern given the ways in which this data is then used at a national level (see Section 6.4). The consultancy firms interviewed find this difficult as they know that the quality of supervision affects the extent to which the borehole design will be suitable for the hydrogeological conditions and the quality of the logging work, and subsequently, their reputation, yet they cannot afford to hire more qualified employees.

When looking at the reasons for why DCs keep their prices low, the answer was simple: the DCs themselves are paid low prices for their turnkey contracts (see Section 5.2.4), they cannot afford to pay consultants any more than they currently do; if they did, they would need to recover this cost somewhere else within the D/I work.

For the DWOs, the reasons for low siting and supervision prices go back to the issues discussed in Section 6.2.3, with limited and tightly stretched DWO budgets being the key issue here. DWOs are continually trying to install the maximum number of HPBs they possibly can within their given budget. Many district water officers know that the price they pay for siting and supervision is insufficient for high-quality work, yet their superiors will not allow them to increase this price. These issues are reinforced by the fact that those who approve the price budgeted for consultancy contracts often have no guidance as to the price needed for high-quality siting and supervision, partly due to the lack of a government regulated engineer’s estimate for siting and supervision in Uganda, and partly due to the confusion caused when consultants are continually quoting insufficient prices in their bids, in the hope that they will win the contract. As explained by one high-level employee within MWE:

“The challenge [with low DWO prices] is based on the amount of money that is available for DWOs and the number of boreholes they want to get out of it. But once again, they have to go to the Council and get approval, if they increase the amount they pay for this, the Council will start asking questions. Then someone else will come in and say ‘no, no, no, I can do the work for that low price’, so the Council will then get confused and think that yes the rate can be kept very low. The council won’t approve their plans if they increase the price. The money we give is controlled by the District Council not us [MWE]” (MWE 2).

The use of lump sum no-water-no-pay payments terms for DCs and the price paid when successful

As explained in Section 5.2.4, lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms dominate HPB drilling in Uganda, with these payment terms being used whenever a turnkey contract is used. While many IAs believe that turnkey contracts coupled with lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms are best given the problems with unsuccessful boreholes (see Section 6.2.1), several concerns were raised among those interviewed as to the quality of siting and D/I work that is being conducted under these contracts. These quality of work issues have the potential to affect: a) the yield of these HPBs in the long-term, b) the extent to which the water quality will be safe for human consumption in all seasons and into the future, and c) the extent to which the community will be able to easily access the HPB in all seasons. These quality of work issues are explained below.

1) Siting based on ‘ease of finding water’

Under turnkey contracts, a great deal of pressure is placed on DCs to find water. If they do not, they will not be paid. As a result, it was widely reported that DCs are siting HPBs in easy to find water areas, for example, in valley areas, near swamps, near wetlands, and near riverbanks. Not only are DCs extremely likely to encounter water in these areas, hence be paid, but they are also extremely likely to find water at much shallower depths than their lump sum was based on. Greater profits can therefore be made in these areas. Such sites, however, are extremely vulnerable to pollution. While a HPB may pass water quality tests at the time of drilling, the water may become unsafe for human consumption in the rainy months as surface pollutant transport and leaching rates increase or in x years’ time as pollutants accumulate in these areas. Furthermore, community access may be limited as these areas are vulnerable to flooding. As explained by two respondents:

“The DC will always look for sites that are easy to drill at [under turnkey contracts], near swamps, in valleys, it doesn’t matter to him if they are near contaminant sources or far from the community, he just wants to find the easiest site so they can get the output they want as quickly as possible. They want to finish the job fast to make more money” (MWE 3).

“I have seen these problems [with turnkey contracts] myself and have shared these concerns with my colleagues from other districts who are still using them. The first is that with the turnkey contract the DC will always choose the most easiest spot to drill... Most of the time they do not decide that which is the most viable but the one that is the easiest for them. So maybe it is down in the valley or across the wetland, just wherever they can drill and get water for a very low cost. Because of that, there is normally a high rate of abandoning the water point because communities feel they have not been provided a facility where they wanted to, so over time they abandon it” (DWO 8).

The likelihood of this occurring without the IA realising until after the HPB is drilled and installed is high given that most of the IAs interviewed do not supervise the siting work or check in on who the DC is using for siting and how they are doing so. Under turnkey contracts it is the DCs responsibility to find water; if they do not, it will be of no loss to the IA. IAs trust that the DC will conduct high-quality siting. As explained by three CSOs:

“We shift the burden to the DC, he will lose if he does not select a good person for siting. So, we trust that he will hire a good surveyor. What he does is up to him. This is not our concern, that is his, we just need water at the end of the day” (CSO 2).

“No we do not check on them [the site the DC selects]. We specify that they have to get a person to site and of course during procurement they submit their personnel and that is where the checks are done, but otherwise there is no follow up, after all, they have to own their results anyway” (CSO 3).

“During the first year we did not [supervise the siting] but we had some challenges. The DC wanted to make extra money so he went towards the swamp where the water was very available so we said no this is not good so that's why we now supervise this part. We need to go through the report and agree with the findings. The DC was not very happy when we started supervising him for this siting part” (CSO 7).

2) Limited hydrogeological training among those conducting the siting work
As explained in Section 5.2.1, when working under a turnkey contract, the majority of the DCs interviewed use their own employees for siting. While these DCs all stated that they have hydrogeologists on staff for this work, this fact was highly disputed when talking with other stakeholders, with many stating that the ‘hydrogeologists’ the DCs claim to have are not indeed qualified hydrogeologists. MWE is well aware of this issue, and to combat this, from July 2017 onwards, for a DC to have their drilling license renewed they must have a MWE licensed hydrogeologist on staff.

3) Short cuts on-site
The no-water-no-pay payment terms of turnkey contracts result in an on-going need for DCs to save money wherever possible so they can cover the costs of unsuccessful boreholes. In order to save, it was reported that certain DCs are known for:

• Using low quality and/or hydrogeologically inappropriate materials, for example, galvanised iron (GI) rising mains rather than stainless steel in aggressive groundwaters. GI rising mains are 4-5 times cheaper than stainless steel (see Section 6.3.3). When GI rising mains are used in aggressive groundwaters, red/brown coloured water post-construction is extremely likely (Casey et al., 2016; Bonsor et al., 2015).
• Short cuts in borehole design. Using fewer materials than specified in the lump sum price is another easy way to save money during construction, for example, through using fewer casing lengths than needed. One consultant reported a case where a DC hit hard rock at 30 metres, yet only cased to 27 metres as they did not want to pay for the extra 3 metres. With 3 metres of unconsolidated rock exposed, siltation over time then became a concern.
• Stopping drilling at the first water strike. A great deal of money can be saved in these instances; in Ethiopia, for example, drilling a borehole to 50 metres instead of 60 metres cuts the drilling cost by 13% (Calow et al., 2012). If the borehole does not penetrate the main aquifer, however, the quantity of water available post-construction may be problematic, even if the borehole passed test pumping at the time of drilling. This is particularly likely if drilling took place in the wet season when the water table was at its highest. As explained by one DWO:

“Because they [DCs] want to cut costs, for example, they might get a water strike but it may not be very sufficient and they need to go deeper to get another strike to be able to give sufficient yield, but they will go for the shallow water which they have got and they finish the well there. These are some of the wells that we find getting affected by climate change, when there is severe drought the source stops bringing water. Why, because sufficient volumes of water were not encountered during construction” (DWO 8).

One DWO interviewed noticed these drilling depth short-cuts in the financial year 2016/17:

“This financial year we decided for turnkey so we get one DC to do the siting and drilling, everything… but we had one issue though where the DC told us that the borehole was 120 metres deep in their report, but in reality it was only 25 metres deep so they had given us a shallow well. I don't know why they did this but we made them going re-site and re-drill” (DWO 16).

• Faking the pump test data or cutting the pump test time short in an attempt to mask low-yielding, unsuccessful sites. For a borehole to be considered successful, water not only has to be found, but the borehole must be able to sustain 500 l/hr. To truly test whether a yield of 500 l/hr is sustainable, a pumping test needs to be conducted for 5 hours according to MacDonald et al. (2005). There is concern, however, that under lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms, pumping tests are being cut short, with the remainder of the data then being made up, as the DCs may be worried that if they test pump for the full 3–6 hours, the borehole will not be able to sustain 500 l/hr, hence they will not be paid. As explained by one consultant:

“The failure rate in my opinion is mainly attributed to the drilling and construction; they accept boreholes that should not be accepted upon test pumping, and that is because they will not be paid if they don’t drill a successful, 500 l, hole. So, they cheat. There won’t be enough water, within the year it is dry. So yes, you need a WUC, this is important, but equally important is that boreholes that are not productive enough upon drilling should never be accepted. They just blow the hole. It could accumulate at 50 l/hr and then the next morning they quickly blow this out and say there is plenty of water and if they had pumped even for an hour it would end up dry” (Consultant 6).

As explained in the above quote, boreholes that should not be accepted upon drilling, may in fact be being accepted. In these cases, the HPB will inevitably be low-yielding post-construction, or in the worst case, dry. While no specific DC admitted to this practice in their interviews, a number of the consultants, MWE employees, and the DCs themselves (reporting on other DC practices) reported this as a major problem.

The likelihood of the above poor practices occurring in the field is expected to increase as the extent of on-site supervision decreases — with this being found to be greatly lacking when turnkey contracts are used in Uganda (see Section 5.2.1).

The above poor practices are also much more likely to occur when the lump sum price is insufficient for high-quality siting and D/I work at the given site. Concerns were raised over the prices IAs are willing to pay DCs in Section 6.2.3, and the fact that, as a result, the DCs winning contracts are typically those that bid low. The worry here, as explained in Section 6.2.3, ]is that DCs are either purposefully (point a and b below) or inadvertently (point c below) quoting prices in their bids that are insufficient for high-quality work at the given site as a result of:

a) competition for the contract,

b) awareness among the DCs bidding of the price the IA is willing to pay,

c) inaccurate technical specifications in the DCs bidding documents.

Furthermore, the above poor practices are also much more likely to occur when the full lump sum is not paid for successful boreholes, as it is meant to be under lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms. As outlined in Section 5.2.4, in a number of cases DCs are only paid admeasurement for the work done/materials used. The whole premise behind a lump sum no- water-no-pay payment terms, however, is that while DCs will lose money when the HPB is unsuccessful, the fact that they will be paid the full lump sum for successful boreholes means that they will be able to recover these costs in due course. When the full lump sum is not paid for successful boreholes, DCs lose this ability to recover their losses. As explained by one DC:

“We have IAs who firstly refused pay for dry hole, but secondly if it is successful, they will only pay us for the metres we drilled. If you are not going to pay us for dry holes you, have to pay us lump sum for the other boreholes, we have accounted for the losses that we make on dry holes, so we need to be paid lump sum for successful if we are ever going to even try to break even… They don’t pay us for dry holes, they don’t pay us for poor water quality boreholes, only when they finally do pay us for the successful ones, they only pay us for the metres we drilled. They will not pay the lump sum that we need to make up for the losses on the other issues. I will be okay not being paid for dry boreholes if they begin to pay us as lump sum for successful, because this way I can account for my losses. Alternatively, they need to pay for the metres drilled in every single borehole, dry, poor water quality, or successful… When you have silly terms in the contracts and silly prices being paid for work, is it any surprise that DCs take short cuts and that the work being done is terrible? DCs cannot deliver good quality work when the prices people are willing to pay are so low, they will always be making shortcuts. Either they will have to buy cheaper poor quality materials, cost cut when drilling, or there will be outright theft, someone says he has drilled 80 metres when he’s actually only drilled 50 or even 40. It is out right criminal. Someone says that the got 800 l/h but in reality it has 200 l/h. He’s been given a contract with the price is so low that he has to save money. He has to say he got water otherwise he will not be paid. But in reality they won’t have even done a pumping test, instead, someone under the mango tree has simply written down some numbers… From the DCs point of view, you were giving such a low price, you have to save money, so many have to cheat on the quality materials they use” (DC 2).

So why, given all of the above issues associated with lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms are these still being used? The answer is simple:

a) IAs do not want to pay for unsuccessful boreholes,

b) IAs do not trust consultants,

c) IA’s find turnkey contracts, with lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms easier to manage.

These are, after all, the reasons that IAs turned to turnkey contracts with lump sum no-water-no- pay payment terms in the first place (see Section 6.2.1). Although MWE greatly discourages the use of these contracts and payment terms, IAs are adamant that they do not want to revert to procuring a consultant for siting and a DC for D/I, as this would require them to pay admeasurement for unsuccessful boreholes. As explained by one CSO:

“At some point there was an argument from the technical people that were reviewing what we are doing and they were saying that maybe we should not pay a lump sum but that we should may pay admeasurement, but the complication here is counting how many metres you have drilled and how many pipes, so we said no at this point because this would be very complicated so let’s give a lump sum. The DC has after built the risk of dry wells and salty wells into this lump sum. We don't want to have to break down every item as this is very complicated and we would have to ensure that for every borehole that we would have a very high level of supervision to ensure that the numbers in their final BoQ post-drilling are correct, this is very difficult” (CSO 7).

Additionally, even when project managers understand the negatives of turnkey, reverting to procuring both a consultant and a DC is difficult given that to do so, permission needs to be sought from their superiors, many of whom are not aware of the technical aspects of this work and the fact that unsuccessful boreholes are a normal phenomenon when siting and drilling. As explained by three DWOs:

“I would prefer it [to go back to procuring both a consultant and a DC] but various stakeholders do not want us to. They do not want us to lose money on dry boreholes. Because there are some situations where the DC does not find water. So they want to get one person to do everything and then the end result is that there must be water. So I would want separate but I can’t even though I have tried to present it to them, I am not allowed to change… [The problem is getting permission from the] district water supply and coordination committee, there is a meeting with different stakeholders like heads of departments, secretaries, the councillors, so that group has never bought into the idea” (DWO 17).

“We know that the MWE discourages turnkey, but in these unsuccessful hole situations, while people higher up in our district start getting annoyed with us paying for dry holes, the MWE is nowhere to be seen. We want to be safe in our jobs, so we have had to keep doing turnkey because that is when we know we are sure to have water” (DWO 7).

“You know the technical people in the district understand that dry holes are normal and but such cases, but to a layperson and our higher-level staff and authority, they do not understand these. If you plan for seven boreholes and you end up with four dry holes it becomes a very big challenge and now it becomes a blame game, the DC will say it was the site I was shown and the consultant will say that he did not anticipate it. And a consultant is normally payed a very small amount, around UGX 2 million, and will normally take three days if they do it well, but many of them want to site two boreholes in one day, maybe even three, so the results can't be good. And now the challenge is that you have to pay the DC admeasurement. So we have to pay for what he has done and he always finds that they take half of the money, so if the borehole was 20 million he can easily take 10 million if maybe he has gone to a depth of 80 metres. Now even if you don't pay the consultant, you find this contract was very minimal, UGX 2 million, compared to the DCs. And now maybe the success rate is 70%, and maybe the contract will say that for 70% we will pay all of the money. So it becomes a very big challenge because we have to pay the DC and the water source is not there and consultant had the 70% success, yet over four dry holes we have spent say 48 million so this becomes a big challenge” (DWO 14).

When then looking at why the price per HPB has remained low, and why some IAs are only paying for admeasurement for successful boreholes, rather than the full lump sum, as with the price consultants are paid (see Section 6.2.7), this all comes back to limited and tightly stretched DWO budgets. As explained in Section 6.2.7, DWOs are continually trying to install the maximum number of HPBs they possibly can within their given budget. As with the consultant prices, many project managers within IAs know that the price they pay DCs is insufficient for high-quality work, yet their superiors will simply not allow them to increase this price. Once again, these issues are reinforced by the fact that those who approve the price budgeted for DC contracts often have no guidance as to the price as to the price needed for high-quality work, partly due to the lack of a government regulated engineer’s estimate for D/I in Uganda, and partly due to the confusion caused when DCs are continually quoting insufficient prices in their bids, in the hope that they will win the contract.

Reluctance among consultants and DCs to bid for DWO work

An on-going consequence of the issues discussed in the previous sections is the fact that 33% of the consultants and 36% of the DCs interviewed are no longer willing to bid for DWO work. The majority of these firms are those with the most experience in Uganda, with most having been in business for the last 15 to 20 years. Given that DWO projects accounted for 68% of the deep boreholes drilled in the financial year 2016/17, this is of great concern as these consultants and DCs are arguably the most experienced in the country. These consultants and DCs cited the following reasons for why they are no longer bidding for DWO contracts:

a) the prices DWOs are willing to pay (see Section 6.2.7 and Section 6.2.8); these consultants and DCs do not want to have to use lower quality materials and cut corners when drilling simply to save on money and time as they do not believe they should be offering sub-standard HPBs to communities and they are also not willing to tarnish the reputation of their companies in doing so,

b) the payment terms DWOs use, especially the incorrect use of lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms for DCs (see Section 6.2.8),

c) bribes during the bidding process (see Section 6.2.5), and

d) late payment.

Table 6.3 provides a series of quotes that help to explain why certain consultants and DCs are no longer willing to bid for DWO work.

Table 6.3 Examples of why certain consultants and DCs are no longer willing to bid for DWO work.

“But I tell you, for the last few years I have not bided for a DWO job because the bidding process is just so silly. You know, they will already know who is going to win the contract before they even advertise. The biggest problem is with the technical specifications that are specified. And the terms and conditions in the contract are very unfavourable to the DC… So I have not drilled for the DWO for the last five years as there is no guarantee that they will pay us, this is not a viable business model for us… Another big issue with DWO is there is no guarantee that you will be paid. They only pay on time 50% of the time. Even when the borehole is successful, they will say, oh we don’t have any money, we’ll have to pay in next quarter. Sometimes this has gone on for a whole year. It was with a district that it took 14 months for me to be paid once... The guarantee of receiving payment is frustrating” (DC 2).

“I strongly believe bidding is just a procedure for most projects. In most cases the DWO are giving contracts after they [the bidder] has paid them for the contract. So, say it is a contract for 100 million, they will want 20 million during bidding. This problem is with DWO, not CSOs, not the MWE… So I have stopped drilling for DWOs, it was too expensive” (DC 3).

“[We stopped working for DWOs because] 1) bureaucracy, 2) no transparency, 3) complicated work, it was hard to know what they wanted and they would try to go back on the contract, and 4) DWO target is not always to get water to the people, the right people, they just wanted water for the cheapest possible price so they would cost cut. This does not lead to the best quality for the people, we want there to be value in what we as a company leave behind” (DC 6).

“We did work for DWOs but we decided to stop because it was getting harder and harder to get. There were more individuals on the market who weren’t paying taxes, don’t have office costs, so the DWO budgets went down because they could get cheaper people, we could not make any money off these contracts” (Consultant 6).

“I don’t like working for the DWO. To be honest they are simply corrupt. It is very hard to get a contract from them, you’ve often got to bribe to simply get the contract. They’ll always asking for extra money. It is disturbing. If you don’t agree to pay them, they will find a way of explaining why you did not get the contract” (Consultant 5).

One DWO interviewed was well aware of the fact that certain DCs are no longer bidding for work in their district and was frustrated by this, as explained below:

“So many of them [DCs] are so business orientated that even during the time of bidding they under quote so they can win the contract. And then during work they now do shoddy work or take shortcuts. And now because of that they have made serious DCs pull out of district work as they cannot win government contracts. Most of the serious DCs are now dealing with CSOs because they know the procurement process is much more transparent and they will be able to get the money that they need to do a good job. But for local government, they cannot. So we have lost some really good DCs because of this, because they cannot compete and most times most local government want to select the lowest bidder... So we have a big challenge here because we don’t want government to lose money by selecting the more expensive DC but this means the really high quality ones have left district work” (DWO 14).

On-the-ground: siting, D/I, and supervision

Siting concerns

No concerns were raised around the general siting methodology used by the consultants and DCs interviewed, with all reporting that they first of all conduct a desk study, and then make their way to the field for discussions with the community, reconnaissance, and resistivity profiling.

As explained throughout the previous sections, however, there are concerns over:

a) the quality of the sites selected under turnkey contracts (see Section 6.2.8 for more detail), and

b) the consultant’s inability to find the best site in a community due to the low prices they are being paid (see Section 6.2.7).

The consultants interviewed were also worried about the accuracy of the resistivity equipment that they are using, and the impact that this has on the accuracy of the siting report details. While the consultants acknowledged that this is not a major issue as their siting report borehole design can be changed once on-site (and the fact that their siting report borehole design is not used to calculate the lump sum price of lump sum no-water-no-pay payment term contracts), they do worry about the impact of this inaccuracy when a capable supervisor is not then on-site to correct their design.

Inaccurate equipment is a result of: a) higher-accuracy equipment not being available to purchase in Uganda and b) the exorbitant cost of buying this out-of-country, given the import tax they then have to pay as they bring it into Uganda. Even if higher-accuracy equipment was available to purchase in Uganda, however, consultants stated that this would be difficult given the low prices they are currently being paid.

Limited opportunity for pre-mobilisation checks

As explained in Section 5.4.1, pre-mobilisation meetings between the IA, DC, the siting consultant (if applicable), and the supervisor are a rarity in Uganda. Such a meeting is important for:

a) checking that the DC has all of the necessary materials and drilling equipment before they mobilise, and

b) notifying the DC of the siting work results, and hence the expected borehole design and materials needed (if a consultant has conducted the siting work), remembering that the siting work is never conducted before the DC is procured (see Section 6.2.6).

Without a pre-mobilisation meeting, there is a risk that the DC will arrive on-site with incorrect equipment and materials, especially if the original design specified in the bidding documents was inaccurate, as is often the case when these are estimated or when stock-standard designs are used. As explained by one consultant:

“You should do the siting, you have the results, these results are then used in the BoQs [that are prepared during bidding], the DC should know what kind of conditions he is going to find in the field. But you find they have procured the DC, he doesn’t even know what to find in the field. He comes with a type of equipment that will not work. You may need mud drilling but he comes with air. Then he comes to drilling and he has issues with collapsing. We try to tell them to be prepared and bring the tools, but sometimes they do not even own the tools they need” (Consultant 1).

Time and money will then be lost as the DC has to re-mobilise the correct materials and equipment for the given sites conditions or the DC may choose to go ahead and drill and construct with incorrect equipment or materials, with the risk of this increasing if a capable supervisor is not on-site.

While the IAs interviewed all stated that, yes, a pre-mobilisation meeting is specified in their DC and consultant contracts, DCs and consultants reported that these never happen due to time pressures, a lack of co-ordination between different actors, and the fact that they are not paid for this time. As explained by two consultants:

“We are actually supposed to have a meeting between the DC, the IA, and us [the consultant] before the drilling starts. But one of the things here is that all construction activities take place in a very short time. You have January – May to complete all of the work. June, you are supposed to be paid, so you must finish your work by end of May. Now that puts everybody in a rush. The DC, you will be calling him wanting to arrange a meeting and he then says he is already on-site ready to drill. You ask if he has looked at the contract, he says oh no no we know it is supposed to be this size, they don’t even know what is in the contract. We need that meeting so we can explain what is in the contract and what we expect from them. At the end of the day there are very few cases where you have meetings, you meet once they have already started drilling. This brings problems... Even when the contracts say they are supposed to install stainless steel pipes, the DC will then bring GI because he has not even read the contract… Because so many times there is a rush, the DC wants to get through it all as fast as possible to then move onto the next one. Then the local government wants to finish as fast as possible so they can pay you as fast as possible so the money it not lost back to central government. So that creates issues. I have talked to the MWE about this many times, that the work is rushed because procurement is not done in a timely manner, or they start late, then you have a rush at the end, the most important part” (Consultant 1).

“We only communicate with the water officer on these findings not the DC. The only communication we then have with the DC is when we start the supervision… we need to be in touch with the supervisor before they go to site. If there is a clause in the contract where the consultant is supposed to brief the DC on what to expect that would save so many things but there is no clause. In most cases consultants have either a little bit of legal training in contracts so they know how to interpret these and if it is not written in there that they need to contact the DC, they are not going to do it because it means money to them. If you're going to introduce that clause it takes time. But basically it is all about talking before deploying. We need an understanding between both parties before you go into the field. It would save on time and the resources in the field. If they have it [a pre- mobilisation meeting], it is simply to introduce us to each other and then send us to the field. It will be five minutes long” (Consultant 9).

D/I concerns

Drilling
No major concerns were raised as to the quality of actual drilling works, except in relation to the inadequate drilling depths that were reported to be of concern under turnkey contracts (see Section 6.2.8) and the lack of water quality monitoring during drilling (see Section 5.4.3). In terms of the latter, if TDS or EC were to be measured during actual drilling, rather than simply at the end, salinity and other water quality issues may be detected early and drilling could be ceased before the entire depth has been drilled. This would, firstly, reduce the DCs losses when lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms are being used, and secondly, reduce the IAs cost if they are paying admeasurement.

Open hole borehole construction
There is widespread concern as to the quality of open hole boreholes that are being drilled and constructed in Uganda. This primarily comes down to the casing issue explained in Section 5.4.2, whereby 5 inch casing is commonly being stretched to fit on top of a 6–6.5 inch open holes in the consolidated rock.

While some see the stretching of 5 inch casing as a clever trick, others are concerned around the impact this will be having on these boreholes over time, specifically:

a) the risk of siltation due to gaps between the casing and the consolidated rock and/or cracks that form in the thinly stretched areas of the casing, and

b) the risk of the casing collapsing into the borehole, especially if the base of the casing was not installed far enough into the consolidated rock.

As explained by one consultant:

“The risk though is whether there is still some space lift that is unconsolidated, so if it is not really hard rock where the casing ends you can: 1) get sediment entering here, and 2) over time the casing may slip and slip and slip and finally collapse into the hole. Also, often the extension that goes into the hole is short, maybe 0.4 metres, so if there is a DC who is not supervised he will not do the detailed calculations, so he will think he has placed it far enough down, but he won’t have, so one side may be hanging and the other resting. There will then be gravel behind this area and while he may develop it well the get clean water to begin with, over time, this gravel can start to give way and this is where siltation can become a big problem for open holes” (Consultant 6).

Two DCs (who are not partaking in this practice) then explained:

“The casing needs to be of uniform thickness, when you stretch it you have no way at all of ensuring this, there is no way it will be uniform by the end and this will only increase wear and tear of this part and ultimately lead to siltation issues. This will only fail over and over again” (DC 8).

“They will end up with silting. When you are warming it, [you will] not get the exact circumference, you will end up with gaps. They get a fire and then they put the casing over the top of this to warm it up and then they get the hammer bit that they drilled with and push the casing onto this to the point where it's stretching and can go over the hammer. But it is not perfect, this is plastic, it will end up with cracks, it won't be as good as the original, and it will end up being thin because you have stretched it” (DC 12).

The use of 5 inch casing is due to a misalignment between the bidding document technical specifications, which typically specify a 4.5 inch hole as per the DIM design with 5 inch casing, and what DCs are willing to drill, with most stating the narrowest open hole they will drill is 6 inch as this is faster, hence less costly for them (see Table 5.3, Section 5.4.2). Furthermore, many do not own smaller drilling bits. Given that the bidding document technical specifications specified 5 inch casing, DCs are not willing to pay for 6 or 6.5 inch casing as this is more expensive and under lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms, they will not be remunerated for this extra expense. As explained by one consultant:

Now that [drilling 4.5 inch in the consolidated area of an open hole design borehole] used to happen in the 80s, 90s, and probably early 00s when they were using the smaller bits. But these days, none of the DCs have these smaller bits, they have these big bits. They prefer to drill holes that in the open area, in the rock at 6 inch. Then they are 8 or 10 at the top. So you have a much wider hole at the bottom than you should. You are supposed to put 5 inch casing at the top of the hole, in the part that is collapsing, that then means that if you leave that casing it will drop into the hole. Sometimes they slip and you have to look for them. Sometimes you won’t get them out and you will lose the hole. The bottom needs to be narrower. They have then had to think how best to do this. So the DCs have figured out how to put the 5 inch in a 6 inch hole, what they do is they now warm the casing, the PVC, they can then stretch the bottom so as it passes through the 8 inch top, it can stretch at the bottom to sit just above the 6 inch part. This happens most of the time. But they had to come up with this idea on how to get the casing to work. The open part is meant to be 4.5 inch, so the 5 inch casing would sit nicely on top. But DCs do not have the 4.5 inch drilling bits, only 6. [So they came up with] some initiative to go around the problem” (Consultant 1).

One DC has solved this issue, however, by designing and manufacturing their own 5 inch casing that has a 6 inch casing packer attached to the bottom, as shown in Figure 6.1..

File:OR18002fig7.jpg

Figure 6.1 5 inch casing with a 6 inch casing packer. Designed by Sumadhura Technologies Ltd.

Use of GI rising mains and the quality of stainless steel rising mains
It is widely recognised that GI rising mains are causing corrosion and water quality issues across Uganda (Casey et al., 2016; Bonsor et al., 2015). In response, MWE has placed a ban on the use of GI for all projects, which came into effect in November 2016. At the time of these interviews (February, 2017 and May, 2017), 50% of DWOs and 44% of CSOs interviewed had implemented this change and were specifying stainless steel in their contracts. The remaining were still specifying GI. There are two key issues with stainless steel, that are hindering the move to stainless steel.

The first is the price off stainless steel, with it being reported that a sufficient grade of stainless steel is 4 – 5 times more expensive than GI. One 3 metre length of GI, for example, costs UGX 45 000 – UGX 70 000, while one 3 metre length of stainless steel costs UGX 150 000 – UGX 210 000. 25% of the DWOs interviewed stated that the cost of stainless steel is greatly limiting their ability to specify this in DC contracts. These district water officers were aware of the problems installing GI causes, however, they cannot increase the price per HPB given their limited and tightly stretched DWO budgets and their need to reach as many people as possible with these. As explained by several DWOs:

“Using stainless steel is hard because it is very expensive. If the borehole price increases, the counsellors start questioning, why now, and then why we are having to do less water sources each year because of this, they don't like us to do less, they want us to do many” (DWO 15).

“We had a very large project in this region about 20 years ago, the RUWASA project. Now under that project they were not financially constrained so they went to the very best materials so most of them were done with stainless steel… Now, when this project ended and we started to receive conditional grants from the government we had to adjust within these budgets and that led to the use of GI and uPVC, but mostly GI. Extra deep boreholes it was a challenge to use uPVC so you have to go for GI and this has its disadvantages. We have very high iron content so we have very bad corrosion every year when we have to go with GI. The pipes are corroded in the first year. But we still have to use GI because we do not have the funds to pay for stainless steel. But looking ahead we have received a policy directive from MWE that places a ban on GI because of corrosion issues. So, they are recommending that we now use uPVC or stainless steel but because stainless steel is very expensive we may not be able to accommodate this in our limited resource envelope. I do not know what we are going to do for those that we can't use uPVC, as we can only go to a depth of 30 metres with these plastic pipes, so I think that for installations deeper than this we are going to have to continue to use GI because we cannot afford stainless” (DWO 12).

“Most times we state GI because it has many advantages because of the cost and they are cheaper for O&M. So, most times when we are installing we say GI because it is much cheaper than stainless steel. And if we use stainless steel we have to construct fewer water sources. And we have very limited budgets so we want to have as many boreholes as possible” (DWO 14).

One DWO has continued installing GI at the time of installation in order to maintain their number of new water source targets each year within the budget they have, with the plan being to then replace these pipes over time using their rehabilitations budget. While this meets the immediate need of getting water to as many people as possible, in reality, it is a waste of resources. If stainless steel was simply paid for to begin with, there would be no need to pay for rehabilitations in the future. However, as explained by the district water officer:

“You know, depending on the depth of installation, sometimes we are forced to install GI because of the cost of stainless steel, the budget does not allow us to install stainless, but most of our water is slightly acidic therefore it attacks the GI and it corrodes it and eventually these pipes need to be replaced… If it can accommodate uPVC we use this, when it goes beyond uPVC that is when you have a choice of GI or stainless steel. In choosing which one to do we have to look at what is available and what is viable with our resource envelope. We have made estimates before they start drilling and if we then reach a situation once they are drilling and they find they need to use a more expensive material, we have a look at the original BoQ and we recalculate to see whether or not it is possible in the budget that we have to use stainless steel. We then have to take a decision to either install fewer water points to recover this cost, or install with inferior material, which is GI and then plan for replacing these material as resources become available. Normally there is pressure from the community, we have started the water source, so we normally go for installing GI, and rehabilitate later. We have to use GI knowing that it won't last very long, our water is normally about 6.8 in pH so we end up with corrosion issues…We have no choice, if we don't have the resources at the time we have to go and install GI well knowing that we will have to come back and replace this later [with our rehabilitations budget]” (DWO 8).

DCs went on to complain that while DWOs and CSOs have started to specify stainless steel in their contracts, they have not increased the price they are willing to pay per HPB to account for these additional costs. Given the low prices that DCs are already facing and the lump sum no- water-no-pay payment terms they are typically operating under (see Section 6.2.8), purchasing stainless steel is not a viable option. As explained by one DC:

“Now they [IAs] are making us put in stainless steel but it is more expensive that GI, yet they don’t pay us any more money. They refuse to increase the price because they don’t have any clue. So we fill in BoQs but no one even looks at these so we just get paid lump sum, and if there is no water will not be paid at all” (DC 10).

This issue was reiterated by a MWE official:

“If we want to increase the quality of work, an increase in price is inevitable and there is nothing we can do about this. If we have to pay UGX 2 million extra for something that does not rust then that is what we have to do. Lump sum contracts are a big issue here. If this lump sums have not changed to allow for the extra price of stainless steel versus GI then this is an issue. We cannot expect DCs to cover this cost, they either will not use stainless steel or will use a low grade” (MWE 1).

In practice, the majority of DCs interviewed are now either continuing to use GI or are importing cheap low grade stainless steel, both of which are going to continue to lead to quality problems over time. The latter raises an additional issue: the lack of control over the quality of stainless steel that is being imported (stainless steel rising mains are not manufactured in Uganda), with there being no guarantee of the quality that is being imported. Given the constant need for DCs to save money on their contracts, there is a risk that even where stainless steel is being used, that the quality is not sufficient as lower grades are much cheaper. As explained by two DCs and one consultant:

“And then there is the issue of the control of materials coming into the country, especially stainless steel. We had a meeting last year with Ugandan Bureau of Standards and they were absolutely lost. They asked the MWE for guidance and they were equally as lost that they were asking for advice from us in the private sector. Give me a break. From the DCs point of view, we’re given such a low price, we have to save money, so many have to cheat on the quality materials they use” (DC 2).

“It [stainless steel] has to be imported, we import ours from India. We import 304 or 305 grade. There is a big issue here though, many are importing from China and the quality is terrible, only 202 grade. But we have no mechanism in Uganda for checking the grade as it arrives in the country so we end up with terrible stainless steel being used” (DC 8).

“For the DCs, you have people getting materials from China and India, you have stainless steel that rusts which is completely wrong, it is supposed to be stainless steel but it rusts, so at the end of the day they do that because they need to save money so badly so they can increase their profit and that is all because we do not have a fixed price doing this kind of work” (Consultant 9).

Extent and quality of supervision

As explained in Section 5.2.1, procuring a consultant for supervision in Uganda was limited among the IAs interviewed: only 38% do so (the reasons for this are explained in Section 6.2.2). Instead, DWO employees, CSO employees, handpump mechanics, and WUCs are used. Concerns were raised among MWE, the TSU, and consultants as to the quality of the supervision work when DWO employees, CSO employees, handpump mechanics, or WUCs are used for supervision, due to:

a) their limited hydrogeological knowledge, and

b) the limited time these people spend on-site when supervising.

Both issues are explained in more detail below.

To supervise HPB D/I, the person responsible must be able to interpret and understand the hydrogeological formation as the DC drills, and as a result of this understanding, advise on the most appropriate borehole design for the given site. MWE employees do not believe that any of these groups of people (DWO employees, CSO employees, handpump mechanics, and WUCs) hold the necessary hydrogeological knowledge required to do so. While this is obvious when handpump mechanics and WUCs are used, MWE stressed the same when DWO or CSO employees are used as the majority are engineers, not hydrogeologists. Engineer’s may understand borehole construction and pump design, but MWE and the consultants interviewed do not believe these people possess the necessary hydrogeological knowledge. As explained by one consultant:

“The people who are district water officers are supposed to have expertise in many things. They are basic engineers, there are very few who are geologists or hydrogeologists. They know things about piped schemes, but when it comes to the borehole, they will not have an idea, especially about the geology and things. But they need to be an all-rounder for their role, but that means there is a gap in their hydrogeology knowledge… And because of this they should not be the primary supervisor on site” (Consultant 3).

One DWO confirmed this skill set issue, admitting that his employees lacked the necessary skills for supervision:

“I have my field offices there [on-site], they are water technicians. But I will be frank and note that I don't think my officers have the skills required to be doing supervision, often the DC is more skilled than the supervisor, in this case it is just a formality to have them move around with them. They will be on-site checking on what they do, but really, they do not have the skills for this work. They have a two-year civil engineering diploma” (DWO 7).

The lack of hydrogeological knowledge among these groups also frustrates DCs, as explained in the following quotes:

“Some supervisors aren’t even competent though, [once we had] a primary school teacher… 90% of the time they [the supervisors] are not competent, they do not know what's going on and they should not be the right person there. So only 10% of the time are we happy with the supervisor” (DC 14).

“We do not like supervision though, in fact, we fear it. They are often newly graduated kids with no experience telling us what we can do. Our staff have far more experience and there have been cases where we have actually lost holes because of the supervisor’s poor decision that we had to listen to and follow” (DC 6).

“We always have our own supervisor but the IA often supplies one as well. We don’t mind having them there, we just get annoyed when they try to tell us what to do, we don’t want to be told how to drill. We have been doing this all about life, the borehole will suffer if you tell us what to. Often they are straight out of university. We have had a lot of battles over the years, but they now seem to understand not fight with us on on-site” (DC 8).

All supervision should be full-time, yet 24% of the IAs that were found to be using DWO employees, CSO employees, handpump mechanics, or WUCs stated that supervision was not full-time. This, coupled with their lack of hydrogeological knowledge greatly limits their ability to guide the D/I process and to verify that the DC is installing hydrogeologically appropriate materials throughout.

Furthermore, while 75% of the DWOs that use their own employees stated that these people were on-site full-time, these claims were strongly contested by MWE employees, TSU employees, and other DWOs (those not supervising their own projects), with these respondents stating that, given the DWO workloads, it is impossible for employees from these offices can be on-site full-time. It is important to note here that none of the DWOs interviewed had all positions filled (Table 6.4), thus the majority are already stretched with their normal workloads. As explained by one MWE respondent:

“There must be [a consultant responsible for supervision], it must not just be the district water officer. If you have 10 boreholes under construction at one go, you often only have 1 or 2 people employed in the DWO, you cannot expect the water officer to supervise all boreholes. He has other work in the office. He has plans to prepare, designs of piped supplies, supervision of other projects, advocacy meetings, district meetings, so many things, he will not have time to supervise all the work. Also on top of this, the district engineer oversees the water office and roads, so you cannot expect him to have sufficient time to supervise. The district should be hiring another supervisor and then the district officer can do supervision at critical moments. The DWO is too thin. If they are doing this, it is wrong. There must always be the consultant who sited the borehole on-site for supervision… If you do not have a private consultant supervising, you will end up with a lot of shoddy work. The districts set themselves up to fail if they are the main supervisors” (MWE 3).

DWOs went on to acknowledge this time on-site issue:

Ideally I would have them there full-time, but I can't say that that happens, I'll be frank, they don't stay there in the field full-time, they just check occasionally, maybe once a day or once every two days, it is hard for me to keep them there full-time on the ground” (DWO 7).

“An engineering assistant from DWO supervisors all works. Now, it is impossible for them to be on-site full-time, but he does go on a daily basis for spot checks” (DWO 4).

Even when the DWO is on-site full-time, however, questions need to be asked as to the effectiveness of their supervision, with one district water officer admitting to sleeping on-site:

“I [district water officer] supervise and during drilling I stay on-site full-time. During drilling, actually, the last borehole we drilled, the DC started drilling around 8 pm through to the morning, I said, look, I will come and sleep in my car. When they are drilling, I must be on-site. This is for the drilling, installation of casing, and blowing up of borehole. They then do the pump testing after this, so I'm not there for that, but normally during the blowing of borehole we can guess how much water is going to be there, so I leave after that” (DWO 5).

One DWO (who procures a consultant for supervision) addressed this issue in the following way:

“We always have the consultant on-site full-time to supervise construction. As the district water officer, I will go and monitor this work but I won’t be there full-time, I simply do not have enough time. I have so much other work to do. If any DWO says that they are able to supervise full-time they are making this up. There is no way any water officer would be able to supervise full time. They have far too much other work that needs to be done” (DWO 3).

Table 6.4 Staff employed on a full-time basis within the DWOs interviewed.

	District Water Officer	Borehole Technician	Assistant Water Officers				Fully staffed**?
			1x	2x	3x	4x
DWO 1	*						No
DWO 2							No
DWO 3							No
DWO 4	*						No
DWO 5							No
DWO 6							No
DWO 7							No
DWO 8							No
DWO 9							No
DWO 10							No
DWO 11	*						No
DWO 12							No
DWO 13							No
DWO 14							No
DWO 15							No
DWO 16							No
DWO 17							No
DWO 18							No
DWO 19							No
DWO 20							No
* Also acting as District Engineer ** To be fully staffed, according to the Sector Grant and Budget Guidelines for financial year 2016/17, the following staff must be employed: 1x District Water Officer + 1x Borehole Technician + 4x Assistant Water Officers

Compounding this DWO time pressure issue is the fact that CSOs often ask DWOs to supervise their works. Given DWOs already stretched time, it is difficult to understand how they then find the time to supervise CSO works. This issue was confirmed by a number of DWOs who stated that when CSOs ask them to supervise, they only have time be time for spot checks, rather than full-time supervision. As explained by two DWOs:

“Yes, they [CSOs] do [ask us to supervise their projects]. They facilitate us to do the work. But we have a problem with the staffing here, we do not have enough people to be supervising the work. So, it is not possible for us to be on-site full-time when we have to supervise for them” (DWO 13).

“But when they [CSOs] ask us to supervise and ask us to be on site full-time, we cannot, we have too much other work to do, but we do supervise every so often. We double check that they rig up at the correct site and then we leave it to the DC. We just tell them that in this district they don't need to go beyond 60 metres” (DWO 9).

DCs also confirmed this issue; as one DC explained:

“There are cases where the IA says they will have a supervisor there, and they won’t, this happens with [prominent CSO], the district water officer is supposed to supervise but they don’t turn up. We call them and they say, ‘oh no, I am not coming, go ahead’” (DC 6).

This lack of DWO supervision for CSO works is of concern as where CSOs are asking the DWO to supervise, there is little CSO monitoring of the DWO work. As stated by one CSO:

“This [checking in on whether the DWO is supervising their projects] would be micromanagement, but our technical staff know what is going on. Also, we have members of the WUC keeping records of this. The DC also has to sign these records. The DWO is aware that it is their role to supervise though and they realise that our work is to supplement government efforts, so if they do not supervise it affects the final product that their communities are left with. So there is a lot of commitment from them” (CSO 4).

Similar views were reiterated by other CSOs. One consultant who has been working in the sector for the past twenty years directly addressed this issue:

“Sometimes CSOs will get the DWO to supervise, but this NEVER happens [never was said in a very loud voice]. They have no capacity, no time. But the CSO assumes the DWO will supervise. Government has written to all CSOs telling them not to use the DWO. The DWO will tell the CSO they will, because the CSO is giving them boreholes so they feel they have to be nice, but they then won’t turn up” (Consultant 1).

Furthermore, if a DWO does supervise for a CSO, this only adds to their already heavy DWO workloads; their DWO work is then put on hold. As explained by one DWO:

“But this [supervising for CSOs] does mean that we don't have time for a normal district work, though we like to supervise as they pay for this extra on top of our normal salary at the district. It is natural to do this, we look for money” (DWO 10).

Quality of data submitted to DWRM and quality of maps produced

While the submission of borehole completion reports to DWRM does not seem to be a problem, there are concerns over the quality of the data that is being submitted, specifically that of the formation logs and the pumping test results. These data quality concerns stem from the issues of limited consultant supervision (see Section 6.3.4) and lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms for the DCs (see Section 6.2.8).

In terms of the formation logs that are submitted in the DCs borehole completion reports, while it is the DCs responsibility to have a member of staff recording these details as the other staff drill, to ensure the accuracy of these, the supervisor is also meant to log and then cross check the DCs logs before they submit their borehole completion reports to DWRM. Without full-time supervision, the supervisor will not be logging themselves, and even with full-time, if the supervisor is not a hydrogeologist (i.e. when DWO employees, CSO employees, WUC, or handpump mechanics supervise), they will not be keeping accurate and detailed logs themselves. For the pumping test results, concerns were raised as to the accuracy of these results when the DC is being paid via lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms, given their need to drill a successful borehole if they are to be paid, hence the temptation to fake the pumping test data. As explained in Section 6.2.8, the risk of fake data being recorded increases when a competent consultant is not on-site monitoring the pumping test. As explained by one consultant:

“One of our biggest worries is the effectiveness of the data they generate when they hire turnkey people [with lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms]. These people look at money and any amount of water that they can get as long as it can serve a handpump. So the data that has been generated through this process is normally very poor. But we are worried that all of these guys will do this and that it is impacting on a database that we have at the water resources department in Entebbe. It is only when you use professionals that you will get accurate data being collected” (Consultant 7).

The quality of this data is crucial given that it is this data that is being used to produce the DWRM water resource maps (see Box 5.2). Inaccurate borehole completion data directly affects the accuracy of these maps, and subsequently, the quality of future water source planning and siting, given that these maps are becoming a key tool for IAs, consultants, and DCs when they are planning for and siting new water sources. As explained by an employee within DWRM:

“Anyone can tell you that the quality of data back when the ministry used to do the drilling compared to when it moved to the private sector has changed. The rate of failure also has something to show here because if the source had such a high yield at the beginning and then after three months or one year it is a different story this brings into question the original data. But some of these things, we can't tell originally. But there are some things that we can tell, so a simple example is if we see a depth of 60 metres but you then say the main water strike was at 70 metres, how is that possible? Then there are really, really basic checks but unfortunately we can't do a lot of the other checks that were like to do so we rely as much as possible as our districts to validate what we get. But we can't do more than this. So you can't always rely on the information that you see in the maps, there is definitely an level of error here (MWE 5).

Exacerbating these data quality issues is the fact that DWRM only requires borehole completion reports to be submitted for successful boreholes. Unsuccessful boreholes are not documented. While this may seem rational (why submit a report for a borehole that was never completed), vital groundwater data is being overlooked and judgments are being made based on incomplete datasets. Furthermore, the DWRM hydrogeological maps are produced using interpolation tools within ArcGIS (interpolation predicts values for a series of raster cells in ArcGIS from a limited number of sample data points). When doing so, a series of successful borehole sites are being used to indicate potential yields and water quality in a given area. Say there are two high- yielding sites within a 5 km radius. ArcGIS will use these successful sites to estimate expected yield within this radius. Because the two data points had high-yields, the 5 km radius will appear to be a viable area for drilling. There may, however, have been four additional unsuccessful boreholes drilled in this area, yet this data is not being used when the maps are produced. If these unsuccessful boreholes were to be included in the interpolation, the resulting map’s yields would look remarkably different. As a result, DWRM are producing a best case, and potentially unrealistic, scenario.

Linkages between a number of the concerns noted

In concluding this section, it is important to note that a number of the concerns noted are related to each other, be it that one causes another, one is affected by another, or a series of concerns are all caused by the same underlying concern. Short cuts on-site (for example, ceasing to drill at the first water strike), limited supervision by a qualified consultant, inaccurate bidding document technical specifications, and siting in swamps, valleys, and wetlands, for example, all stem from the prolific use of turnkey contracts with lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms. The number of times different sections were referred to throughout the text and the number of times the same concerns were mentioned yet again, will have hinted at these linkages/relationships. A series of holistic changes are therefore needed, with several examples being outlined in the following section.